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Retributive Responses
Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, Axel Ockenfels*
Abstract
Retributive responses do play a role in human behavior. Whether they are
primarily triggered by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions
is an important question. It can be addressed by experimental studies of retributive
responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful conse-
quences without intending and intend harmful consequences without inflicting
them. Our experimental results indicate that retributive responses are more
strongly influenced by observed consequences than by ascribed intentions.
However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by
concerns that are non-retributive altogether in that they focus on end state
distributions independently of who brought them about.
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1. Introduction
Retributive responses are acts of reward or punishment triggered by bygone events. As
opposed to strategic sanctions retributive responses are incompatible with the future-
directedness of the economic model of rational behavior. This may be one of the reasons why
retributive responses did not receive as much attention from economists as reciprocal
responses which may be seen as emerging in "the shadow of the future" (Axelrod 1984). We
think that this situation needs to be rectified (see on retribution from a philosophical point of
view Mackie 1985, essay, XV and within a psychological perspective Shaver 1985). Humans
do behave differently towards those who have done them good than towards those who have
treated them badly in the past. Rather than disputing that truly backward looking retributive
responses exist their workings should be better understood.
The retributive responses that influence conflict and co-operation in our social lives basically
fall into two classes. On the one hand, people respond to the good or bad consequences of acts
of others quite independently of the intentions of the actors. We shall refer to such responses
as consequentialist. On the other hand, the assumed intentions of actors influence retributive
responses to their deeds. We shall refer to such retributive responses as intentionalist. For
example in law the distinction between manslaughter – in case of unintended killing – and
first degree murder – in case of intended killing – is intentionalist. The absence or presence of
an intention to kill differentiates the two cases of inflicting death. At the same time the
distinction between attempted murder and first degree murder is consequentialist. Whether
the accused is tried merely for attempted murder or for first degree murder hinges on whether
or not his victim dies, i.e. on consequences.1
                                
1 An anonymous referee suggested the preceding examples from the Anglo-Saxon legal
tradition for illustrating the, in our terminology, intentionalist and consequentialist
perspectives, respectively.  Inflicting punishments does not only serve retributive purposes but
also the prospective one to deter potential criminals from doing harm in the future. But in any
event the distinction between intentionalist and consequentialist perspectives is of great
importance. Our interest in the topic was originally triggered by a striking German case in
which two subjects got into the apartment of an elderly couple whom they forced to open the
safe. The burglars took every pre-caution to protect the couple’s health. They gave their
victims -- as could be proved later on -- the medication for their weak hearts and induced  the
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In our ordinary lives both consequentialist and intentionalist kinds of motivation are present.
It is often unclear, however, which is the driving force and when. In view of this it seems that
a better understanding of how in fact consequentialist and intentionalist views influence our
behavior is highly desirable. We therefore conducted two variants of an experiment designed
to elicit retributive responses. In the experiment acts which are associated with harmful
consequences under specific conditions are not under other conditions. Observing how
responses to acts vary with consequences provides some insights into the relative importance
of intentionalist and consequentialist retributive inclinations. But it also shows that retributive
responses either to intentions or consequences can be over-shadowed by non-retributive
normative considerations.
2. The experiment
We study two variants of one experimental game that only differ in the descriptions of the
choice alternatives presented to the subjects. In the first variant of the experiment, the
"objective treatment" henceforth, the alternatives are described in neutral terms (see the
appendix). Beyond informing them about the payoff structure itself, the participants are not
specifically induced to perceive the situation within a retributive frame of reference. In the
second variant, the "resentment treatment" henceforth, retribution is invited by the framing of
the experiment. The experiment is described in value laden terms like "enforcer", "defector"
etc. suggesting a "moralistic" point of view (see on “moral resentment” Strawson 1962).
2.1. The decision situation
In the experiment small groups of four individuals are exposed to a situation of mutual
externality. In each group of four, three of the individuals are playing in a player A role and
one in a player B role. Each A player has to decide between a cooperative alternative C and a
                                                                                                    
police to look after the couple (incidentally voice recording afterwards provided the crucial
clue revealing the criminals’ identity). Tragically the two victims died, nevertheless. A lower
German court decided that there was no intention to kill and reached a rather mild verdict
while a higher court later on insisted that in view of the consequences the trial be repeated and
a harsher verdict be found.
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non-cooperative alternative D. (In the questionnaire the alternatives were described as “A1”
and “A2”, respectively, but here we use the conventional “C” as a reminder of cooperation
and “D” as a reminder of defection.) Those A players who choose to defect risk a harmful
effect on the payoffs of the other players in the group. At the same time, however, a chance
move determines whether their defective choice is observable to the player B who fixes the
payoffs of ‘caught’ defectors (but cannot influence payoffs of uncaught defectors).2  In
particular, f or all possible contingencies in which at least one choice of D occurs, that is for
all numbers i=0, 1, 2, of A players who might choose C, player B assigns the payoffs P(i) for
found out D-choosers. Table 1 shows the payoffs of the group-members for alternative
numbers of C-choosers in the group. The payoff consequences are known to all players.
Number of
Choosers of C







as fixed by B
0 5 DM - 15 DM P(0) DM
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM P(1) DM
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM P(2) DM
3 10 DM 10 DM - -
Table 1: Payoffs depending on the number of C-choosers
If nobody chooses C then choosers of D whose die shows 1, 2, 3, 4 receive 15 DM while
those who are found out end up with P(0), 0≤P(0)≤15 DM. Here P(0) is the amount the player
in role B fixes as appropriate for a detected D-chooser if nobody chooses C. Player B receives
5 DM if no A player chooses C.
If exactly one person chooses C then this person receives 5 DM. Player B still receives 5 DM
and in that sense does not benefit from the one C-chooser's restraint. All D-choosers who are
                                
2 In the experiment, subjects, after they have made their choices, had to throw a die in order to
determine whether they are caught. A chooser of D was treated as found out if and only if the
numbers 5 or 6 came up. Since we wanted to protect anonymity, all players (including B
players and cooperative A players) threw a die, but, of course, the outcome of the chance
event affected only the payoffs of defective A players.
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not found out receive 15 DM while those who get caught end up with P(1), 0≤P(1)≤15 DM.
Here P(1) is the amount the player in role B fixes as appropriate for a found out D-chooser if
one other individual chose D as well.
If two persons chose C then both receive 10 DM and so does player B while the single
chooser of D, if undetected, gets 15 DM and P(2), 0≤P(2) ≤15 DM, if his die shows 5 or 6.
If all A choose C then all members of the group including B receive 10 DM. Obviously for
that contingency B need not assign anything.
In the two cases in which at least two of the As co-operate exactly the same payoffs accrue to
the C-choosers and to B. To put it slightly otherwise, a single D-chooser does no harm so that,
from a consequentialist point of view, there is no reason to punish the defector. Morally,
however, the situation in which there is a single D-chooser is somewhat ambiguous. For
example, a straight-forward utilitarian – i.e. a person who believes that an act is morally right
if and only if it maximizes the non-moral utility for all individuals -- could argue that the
single D-chooser at least after the fact did “the right utility or welfare maximizing thing” by
choosing D if the other As chose C. But what is right by hindsight may not be right
beforehand. In the light of foresight the action of the single D-chooser may be viewed as
imposing the risk of losing five units on the other members -- which would happen should
there be at least one other D-chooser. On behalf of the risk imposed even a straightforward
utilitarian who insists on choosing acts that are expected to bring about utility maximizing
consequences might criticize the behavior for violating the requirement of choosing what is
best in the light of foreseeable or expected consequences.Of course, within an intentionalist
moral perspective, defection must be clearly criticized as well.
If exactly two choose D then none bears the sole responsibility for the causal effects brought
about by their actions. Still in the case of the two choosers of D each of them could have
causally effected the other alternative by choosing otherwise. Each of the D-choosers could
have chosen C and thereby produced a positive external effect. A consequentialist could
therefore clearly criticize individuals for choosing D.
If, however, none of the individuals in role A chooses C then a single change of action is
causally ineffectual in the sense of there being no external effects on the payoffs of the
remaining players, including B. Therefore, arguably, there is no basis for consequentialist
retribution (choosing C can and by the straightforward utilitarian should be deemed wrong).
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However, within intentionalist moral perspectives choosing C may be viewed as obligatory
regardless of the causal insignificance of individual behavioral changes.
2.2 Conducting the experiment
In total, 243 students of economics participated in two classroom experiments, each
examining one framing variant of the underlying decision situation. Participants were
randomly assigned to A or B player roles. No subject participated twice. All choices were
made secretly and anonymously (each subject’s choices were identified with the help of a
code number) and all subjects were paid according to their decisions and the rules of the
game. (The decision sheets reproduced in the appendix show in detail how the two differently
framed variants of the experiment were conducted.) In the objective treatment B-players were
merely asked to fix the payoffs P(.) and A-player actions were described as A1 (C in the
description) and A2 (D in the description). In the resentment treatment B-players were asked
to adopt the role of an "enforcer" who would "punish" "defectors" for alternative numbers of
"staying on co-operators". B-players knew that their assignments would not be announced and
in that sense could not have any preventive effect on the behavior of A-players.
Since there were more individuals in role B than there were groups, some of the role B
individuals were randomly assigned to one of the groups. Afterwards it was decided by lot
whose payoff assignment would be used in determining the payoff.3 Remaining A players
were treated analogously. In the objective treatment, 8 role A individuals and 3 role B
individuals did not correctly answer the control questions which were included on the
decision sheet to check whether the rules were understood. In the resentment treatment 4
subjects did not answer the control questions correctly.4 Statistical scrutiny revealed no
                                
3 This implies that one and the same group of three A role participants may be relevant for
more than one B role player. In that case, from the B players assigned to the group of A
players, one B role player is chosen by lot. The payoff assignment made by this chosen player
becomes payoff relevant for the group of A players. Like this player all other B players
assigned to that group of A players receive the payoffs determined by the choices of the A-
members of the group.
4 Though this effect is statistically insignificant, p it possibly reflects that the resentment
treatment triggered more appropriate intuitions than the objective treatment. For the number
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correlation between the subjects’ proclivity to answer the control questions correctly or
incorrectly and their player roles in the experiment, the treatments, or their choices. The 15
individuals who did not understand the game properly could therefore be excluded from the
final analysis without loss.
Our subsequent discussion of the objective treatment is based on responses of 112 individuals
of whom 75 served as role A players and 37 as role B players. The discussion of the
resentment treatment involves 116 individuals of whom 77 were assigned to the player A and
39 to the player B role.
A players were asked to make their payoff relevant decision of either C or D and a
hypothetical – payoff irrelevant -- decision by counterfactually adopting the B player role.
Likewise B players were asked to make two types of decisions. First, they were asked to fix
the payoff for a found out D player contingent on the number of other D players. Second, B
players were asked to adopt hypothetically the A player role and to indicate how they would
have chosen then.
3. Results and interpretation
3.1 Average behavior
Table 2 shows the numbers of observations and the average choices in both treatments for
both types of players separately, while Figure 1 illustrates the average payoff assignments to a
D-chooser. Several features of the average data should be noted. First, average payoff
assignments are strictly increasing in the number of C-choosers (two-sided Wilcoxon signed
ranks tests yield significance on the 5 percent level for the comparison between P(0) and P(1)
and for the comparison of P(1) and P(2), separately; the same statistical conclusions hold if
one analyzes the data for the objective and resentment treatments or for the A and B players
separately).
Second, not surprisingly, in the resentment treatment the average payoff assignments as
shown in Table 2 to a D-chooser are markedly lower (the average difference is 1.82 DM) than
                                                                                                    
of 116 individuals participating in the resentment treatment was even larger than the number
of 112 individuals participating in the objective treatment.
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in the objective treatment (exact two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests yield p = .000, .000, and
.021 for P(0), P(1), and P(2), respectively). However, framing the decision in a moralistic and
retributivist framework, suggesting personal responsibility for "staying on" as opposed to
"defecting", did not significantly enhance the proclivity to make C-choices in the A player
role. There are only about two percent less D-choosers in the moralistic frame (p = .73, exact
two-sided Fisher test). A-players who understand the game and payoff structure seem to
perceive the interaction similarly in both treatments. In any event, the surprising robustness of
A-behavior when varying the frame (see more generally on frame or presentation effects,
Pruitt 1967, and Kahneman and Tversky 1984) suggests that the motivational factors driving




























75 37 77 39 152 76
6.42 4.40 5.40P(0)
[average] 7.18 4.89 4.72 3.79 5.93 4.33
6.96 4.86 5.89P(1)
[average] 7.68 5.49 5.32 3.96 6.48 4.70
9.25 7.91 8.57P(2)
[average] 9.97 7.81 8.44 6.86 9.19 7.32
83.93 81.90 82.89D-chooser
[percent] 88.00 75.68 85.71 74.36 86.84 75.00
Table 2: Average data










objective: A players objective: B players
resentment: A players resentment: B players
Figure 1: Average payoff assignments for D-chooser arranged according to treatment and
payoff relevant (B player) and hypothetical (A player) choices
Third, there is a general self-serving tendency when specifying choices (see on self-serving
biases in a somewhat different vein Babcock and Loewenstein 1997). Those who – either in
their payoff relevant or in their hypothetical choices as A role players – made D-choices
would on average assign significantly higher payoffs to found out D-choosers (exact two-
sided Mann-Whitney U-tests yield p = .018, .000, and .005 for P(0), P(1), and P(2),
respectively). Moreover, A players when hypothetically adopting the B player role, assigned
higher payoffs to detected D-choosers than B players (all corresponding two-sided Mann-
Whitney U-tests yield significance on the 5 percent-level).5 Finally, hypothetical C-choices
are coming forward more easily than payoff relevant C-choices (p = .020, exact one-sided
Fisher test; the corresponding value is .05 for the objective treatment data and .10 for the
resentment treatment data). Apparently solidarity is more likely to be expressed if this can be
accomplished at no cost.
                                
5 Since we did not find any statistically (or economically) significant effects of the treatment
on the self-serving biases reported here, we suppress the corresponding results.
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3.2. Patterns in individual payoff assignments
Alternative patterns6 of payoff assignments may be interpreted as qualitatively distinct
responses. In the experimental data one can distinguish the following typical patterns of
payoff assignments:
PI- P(0)=P(1)=P(2),




Almost all, namely 221 out of the 228 responses included in the analysis, conform to one of
the patterns. In view of the monotony of the prevailing patterns it seems safe to conclude that
the assignments -- including the hypothetical ones -- were made in a deliberate way. The
patterns of hypothetical assignments (by A players) and the non-hypothetical assignments (by
B players) for found out D-choosers showed no significant differences. Neither was there a
significant difference in the pattern distribution between the objective and the resentment
treatment. (Though type PIIa is somewhat more and type PIII somewhat less frequently
chosen under the resentment treatment, none of the corresponding χ2 is significant on the
10% level.) The distribution of patterns of payoff assignments is represented in Table 3.
                                
6 Each participant chooses a vector of payoffs (P(0), P(1), P(2)). We can therefore explore










A (#75) 22 22 18 9 4
B(#37) 10 11 11 4 1
Sum 1 32 33 29 13 5
Resentment treatment
A (#77) 20 33 18 5 1
B(#39) 13 15 8 2 1
Sum 2 33 48 26 7 2
Both treatments
Sum 1+2 65 81 55 20 7
Table 3: Distribution of Patterns of Payoff Assignments
PI
In this pattern whether the payoff of others is affected by individual choices of D or not does
not matter.. Of the 65 subjects who were assigning payoffs according to PI only 14 chose
(P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (0, 0, 0). In this case the lowest possible payoff is assigned to any found
out D-chooser, no matter what. This may indeed indicate intentionalist retributive responses
in the narrow sense of being guided by the desire to punish actors for their imputed bad
motives. Still, even though the design of our experiment carefully avoided any invitation to
endorse preventive views of punishment it cannot be completely excluded that some
participants nevertheless perceived the situation that way when assigning (P(0), P(1), P(2)) =
(0, 0, 0).
Another 16 of the 65 whose assignments exhibited pattern PI chose (P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (15,
15, 15). The primary concern of this basically non-retributive response may not be equality
but rather efficiency. For, if under this assignment all A players choose D, the payoff sum is
guaranteed to be maximal for the group. But it may also be that the players who assigned
(P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (15, 15, 15) interpreted the choice in the A player role as a gambling task
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and refrained from retribution because they did not want to see the merely unfortunate ones
punished.
In the objective treatment 10 of the 22 A players with pattern PI decided on
P(0)=P(1)=P(2)=15 while only one of the 10 B players who favored the PI pattern chose a
payoff of 15 for all contingencies. Thus payoff maximization for the whole group is not the
driving motive. It seems plausible that the A players with P(0)=P(1)=P(2)=15, when adopting
hypothetically the player B role, nevertheless perceived themselves primarily as "A cum D"-
players (of the 10 A players who hypothetically assigned a PI-pattern of value 15 in the
objective treatment merely one chose C). In any case a self-serving consideration seems more
relevant than assigning payoffs in response to imputed intentions. The 5 observations of the
PI pattern (P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (15, 15, 15) in the resentment treatment are also hypothetical
and thus of the self-serving kind.
There were 7 choices of (P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (5, 5, 5) and 9 choices of  (P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (10,
10, 10). It is possible that these uniform assignments were chosen merely for reasons of
prominence. However, the pattern PI assigning 5 DM no matter what may also be viewed as
appropriate "punishment". It will bring down the found out D-chooser to the minimum
guaranteed payoff of participants. The pattern that assigns 10 units to the found out D-player
most plausibly seems to indicate a desire to reach the "fair egalitarian" distribution which
emerges if all choose C in the A player role.
PII
There are two variants of PII, namely PIIa and PIIb.
PIIa
Here non-retributive, outcome oriented considerations of fairness seem to play a prominent
role. This is borne out by the fact that 42 (that is 18% of all 228 and 52% of the relevant
subcategory of 81) participants assigned P(0)=P(1)=5 and P(2)=10. By this most frequently
chosen assignment it is guaranteed that deviators, should they be detected, receive exactly the
same payoff as the co-operators and B. More generally speaking the pattern PIIa may in fact
be neither intentionalist nor consequentialist but simply non-retributive. Distributional
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concern with end states seems so strong that it overshadows considerations of personal
responsibility for bringing about those states.
PIIb
P(0)<P(1) cannot be explained by a difference in the external consequences exerted on others
since there are no such differences. Again retributive responses -- either to intentions or
consequences of acts -- cannot explain payoff assignments. Outcome oriented non-retributive
concerns must be involved -- like in considering a breach of norms as more serious and
requiring stronger responses if the number of breaches increases.
PIII
As opposed to the preceding cases in which payoff functions are increasing in the number of
individuals who co-operate, the payoff pattern PIII is strictly decreasing in the number of co-
operators P(0)>P(1)>P(2). Between all and merely two co-operators the deviation does not
cause any damage. Yet a detected deviator gets less than an undetected one, since DM 15
>P(2). Likewise, even though the change from none to one in the number of co-operators is
inconsequential for the payoff of others, we still have P(1)<P(0).
For the emergence of the retributive pattern PIII non-consequentialist factors are at least co-
responsible. If nobody co-operates anyway, then deviation does no harm and it may seem
unjustified within a consequentialist perspective to punish it as severely as in cases of more
frequent co-operation. On the other hand, if all others co-operate then a single deviation does
no harm either but it cannot be excused by pointing to other deviations. In short, whereas
pattern PIIb might be explained by the view that a higher frequency of norm breaches requires
tougher responses the pattern PIII may be the outcome of an opposite tendency of excusing
breaches by other breaches of norms.
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3. Discussion
The quantitative level of retributive responses somewhat varies with the framing of the
decision task. But the distribution of qualitative patterns is surprisingly robust across
treatments. The patterns discussed in the preceding section reveal quite some heterogeneity in
responses. For instance, at least those individuals who chose to assign (P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (0,
0, 0) in their practical retributive responses focus on individual behavior per se rather than on
its consequences. In all likelihood the retributive responses of such individuals are triggered
by the intentions that they see expressed in other individuals' behavior. But in our data only
6% of the choices can be conclusively interpreted this way.
On the other hand, those individuals (7%) who chose (P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (15, 15, 15) seem to
focus on fairness between detected and undetected defectors and those (18%) who chose
(P(0), P(1), P(2)) = (5, 5, 10) seem to focus on fairness between detected defectors, co-
operators and the B player. It is at least open if not unlikely whether their responses are
retributive at all. More generally, with the possible, in fact rather plausible, exception of the
uniform assignment of zero payoffs always non-retributive considerations seem at least co-
responsible for the assignments. From this it may be concluded that retribution which plays a
prominent role in more theoretical moral or legal discussions, in particular of punishment, is
rarely a dominant motive in practice. And this holds good quite independently of whether
consequences or intentions are regarded as the proper focus of retribution.
A related issue recently came up in the research on the ‘nature of reciprocity’. While Rabin
(1993), among others, holds the view that reciprocal behavior is triggered by the belief that
another’s action was good or ill intended, more recent theories by Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) rely on attempts to implement fixed preferences over
payoff allocations. While the former model might be interpreted in retributive terms, in fact in
terms of what we called intentionalist retribution, the latter approaches appear to be more in
line with non-retributive distributional motivations for payoff assignments.
Of course non-retributive distributional considerations often cannot be separated empirically
from consequentialist retribution. Reciprocal action can only be triggered when the others’
actions actually change the actor’s set of feasible payoff distributions and therefore depend
directly on the consequences of others’ actions. The (rare) experimental evidence on the
impact of distributional considerations versus intentionality is mixed. While most studies in
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experimental economics provide substantial support for the influence of distributional
considerations on reciprocal actions, some also provide evidence for intentionality (see
Blount, 1995, Charness, 1996, Kagel, Kim and Moser, 1996, and for a discussion of this issue
Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels, 1998 and 2000). In any event the remarkable inter-individual
variety of response patterns in our experiment speaks clearly against some philosophical and
common sense views which claim that there are some quite universal retributive responses.
Our results indicate that there seems to be robust variety rather than uniformity including
entirely non-retributive concerns along with intentionalist and consequentialist retributive
responses.
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Instructions for the objective and the resentment treatment
(Translation from German.)
A. Instructions for the objective treatment
DECISION SITUATION:
You are a member of a group of four. There are three “A decision makers” and one “B
decision maker” in each group. You will be informed as to whether you are an A or B from
the decision sheet enclosed.
The three A decision makers each decide between the alternative A1 and the alternative A2.  If
two of the three As choose alternative A1, then those who have chosen A1 as well as the B
decision maker receive 10 DM.  If only one or none of the As chooses alternative A1, then the
one who has decided on A1 and B each receive 5 DM.
The payoff of those who choose A2 depends on chance and the decision of B. All choosers of
A2 must throw a die once. The A2-choosers who end up with a 1, 2, 3, or 4 receive 15 DM.  If
they throw a 5 or a 6, B decides what they get as A2-choosers. B can make his decision
dependent upon the number of members in the group who have chosen A2. The payoff of the
A2-choosers must lie between 0 and 15 DM.
The following table sums up the payoff rules. Each of the A decision makers chooses either
A1 or A2. Dependent on the number of A1-choosers in the group, the B decision maker fixes




Payoff of B Payoff of the A1-
Choosers
Payoff of the A2-Choosers
Die Result:
1, 2, 3 or 4
Die Result:
5 or 6
0 5 DM -- 15 DM           DM*
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM           DM*
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM           DM*
3 10 DM 10 DM -- --
* The payoff is to be decided by B.  It must be between 0 and 15 DM.
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CONDUCTING THE EXPERIMENT:
The decision sheet informs you whether, in your group, you adopt the role of being one of the
A decision makers or that of the B decision maker. We kindly ask you to answer the control
question first and then to fill out the decision sheet for the other role --  purely hypothetically.
After you have made your own payoff-relevant decision, please put your decision sheet into
the envelope that you have received.
Now every participant must throw a die. The result of throwing the die will be marked on the
envelop.  The result of throwing the die is, obviously, relevant only for those who chose A2.
But since we intend to protect the anonymity of the participants and do not know whether you
are an A2-chooser or not, all participants must throw a die. After that we will collect the
envelopes with the decision sheets.
The different groups, each composed of three A decison makers and one B decision maker,
can be identified by your code-number. Your payoffs are calculated according to the rules and
will be paid out in cash later. In order to receive the payoff, you need the card from your
envelope which like the decision sheet is marked with your code-number. Using the card, we
can identify you. It serves, in particular, as a voucher for receiving the payoff next week in the
office of our secretary (W-Building, Room C-213, 9:00-12:00 a.m.). So, be careful not to lose
the card!  Since identification takes place through the code-number, the anonymity of your
decision is protected.
If you have any questions concerning procedures or concerning the interpretation of the
decision situation, please raise your hand and we will come to you. All other side
conversations are strictly forbidden.
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Decision Sheet for A
Control Question:  Assume that one A in your group chooses alternative A1and two As
choose alternative A2.  Assume further that B has fixed a payoff of 7 DM for those A decision
makers who ended up with a 5 or 6 after throwing the die. What is the payoff of the different
group members if one of the A2-choosers throws a 3 and the other one a 5?
--Payoff of the A1-chooser: DM
--Payoff of the A2-chooser who has thrown a 3: DM
--Payoff of the A2-chooser who has thrown a 5: DM
--Payoff of B: DM
................................................................................................................
Your Hypothetical Decision in the Role of B
You have been assigned the role of an A decision maker!  Please decide, purely
hypothetically, as if you were assigned the role of B.  Note in the grey cells of the following
table how you would decide based on the number of the A1-choosers in your group.
Number of A1-
Choosers
Payoff of B Payoff of the A1-
Choosers
Payoff of the A2-Choosers
Die Result:
1, 2, 3 or 4
Die Result:
5 or 6
0 5 DM -- 15 DM DM*
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM DM*
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM DM*
3 10 DM 10 DM -- --
* The payoff must be between 0 and 15 DM.
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Your Decision as A
Please check your decision here.  Be aware that this decision affects the payoffs.
I choose the alternative: O A1 O A2
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Decision Sheet for B
Control Question:  Assume that one A in your group chooses alternative A1and two As
choose alternative A2.  Assume further that B has fixed a payoff of 7 DM for those A decision
makers who ended up with a 5 or 6 after throwing the die. What is the payoff of the different
group members if one of the A2-choosers throws a 3 and the other one a 5?
--Payoff of the A1-chooser: DM
--Payoff of the A2-chooser who has thrown a 3: DM
--Payoff of the A2-chooser who has thrown a 5: DM
--Payoff of B: DM
................................................................................................................
Your Hypothetical Decision as A
You have been assigned the role of B!  Please decide, purely hypothetically, on the
assumption that you would have been assigned the role of an A decision maker.
I choose the alternative: O A1 O A2
.................................................................................................................
Your Decision in the Role of B
Please decide on the payoff of the A2-choosers who happen to throw a 5 or 6. Note in the grey
cells of the following table the payoffs based on the number of the A1-Choosers in your




Payoff of B Payoff of the A1-
Choosers
Payoff of the A2-Choosers
Die Result:
1, 2, 3 or 4
Die Result:
5 or 6
0 5 DM -- 15 DM DM*
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM DM*
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM DM*
3 10 DM 10 DM -- --
*The payoff must be between 0 and 15 DM.
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B. Instructions for the resentment treatment
DECISION SITUATION:
You are a member of a group of four.  There are three "decision makers" and one "enforcer"
in each group.  You will be informed as to whether you are a decision maker or an enforcer
from the decision sheet enclosed.
The three decision makers each decide between the alternative to stay with the group and the
alternative to defect.  If two of the three As choose to stay, then those who stay as well as the
enforcer receive 10 DM. If only one or none of the decision makers chooses to stay, then the
one who has decided to stay and the enforcer each receive 5 DM.
The payoff of those decision makers who defect depends on chance and the decision of the
enforcer:  All defectors must throw a die once.  The defectors who end up with a 1, 2, 3, or 4
receive 15 DM.  If they throw a 5 or a 6, the enforcer decides what they get as defectors.  B
can make his decision dependent upon the number of members in the group who have chosen
to stay.  The payoff of the defectors must lie between 0 and 15 DM.
The following table sums up the payoff rules.  Each of the decision makers chooses either to
stay or to defect.  Dependent on the number of those who stay in the group, the B enforcer









1, 2, 3 or 4
Die Result:
5 or 6
0 5 DM -- 15 DM DM*
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM DM*
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM DM*
3 10 DM 10 DM -- --
*The empty fields in the last column will be filled in by the enforcer. Those payoffs must be
between 0 and 15 DM.
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CONDUCTING THE EXPERIMENT:
The decision sheet informs you whether, in your group, you adopt the role of being one of the
decision makers or that of the enforcer.  We kindly ask you to answer the control question
first and then to fill out the decision sheet for the other role --  purely hypothetically. After
you have made your own payoff-relevant decision, please put your decision sheet into the
envelope that you have received.
Now every participant must throw a die.  The result of throwing the die will be marked on the
envelop.  The result of throwing the die is, obviously, relevant only for those who chose to
defect.  But since we do not know whether you are a decision maker or an enforcer and in the
latter case whether you are a defector, all participants must throw a die. After that we will
collect the envelopes with the decision sheets.
Now we will randomly form groups with three decision makers and one enforcer each. Your
payoffs are calculated according to the rules and will be paid out in cash later.
In order to receive the payoff, you need the card from your envelope which like the decision
sheet is marked with your code-number. Using the card, we can identify you. It serves, in
particular, as a voucher for receiving the payoff next week in the office of our secretary
(Room 412, Frau Janette Böhnisch). So, be careful not to lose the card and present it for the
pay out! Since identification takes place only through the code-number, the anonymity of your
decision is protected.
If you have any questions concerning procedures or concerning the interpretation of the
decision situation, please raise your hand and we will come to you.  All other side
conversations are strictly forbidden.
26
Decision Sheet For a Decision Maker
Control Question: Assume that one decision maker in your group chooses to stay and two
decision makers choose to defect. Assume further that the enforcer has fixed in this case a
payoff of 7 DM for those decision makers who ended up with a 5 or 6 after throwing the die.
What is the payoff of the different group members if one of the defectors throws a 3 and the
other one a 5?
--Payoff of the staying on decision maker: DM
--Payoff of the defector who has thrown a 3: DM
--Payoff of the defector who has thrown a 5: DM
--Payoff of the enforcer: DM
................................................................................................................
Your Hypothetical Decision in the Enforcer Role
Please decide, purely hypothetically, as if you were assigned the role of an enforcer. Note in
the gray cells of the following table how you would decide based on the number of those who









1, 2, 3 or 4
Die Result:
5 or 6
0 5 DM -- 15 DM DM*
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM DM*
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM DM*
3 10 DM 10 DM -- --
*The empty fields in the last column will be filled in by the enforcer. Those payoffs must be
between 0 and 15 DM.
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Your Decision as Decision Maker
Please check your decision here.  Be aware that this decision affects the payoffs.
O I stay with the group O I defect
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You are an Enforcer
Control Question: Assume that one decision maker in your group chooses to stay and two
decision makers choose to defect. Assume further that the enforcer has fixed in this case a
payoff of 7 DM for those decision makers who ended up with a 5 or 6 after throwing the die.
What is the payoff of the different group members if one of the defectors throws a 3 and the
other one a 5?
--Payoff of the staying on decision maker: DM
--Payoff of the defector who has thrown a 3: DM
--Payoff of the defector who has thrown a 5: DM
--Payoff of the enforcer: DM
................................................................................................................
Your Hypothetical Decision as a Decision Maker
Please decide, purely hypothetically, on the assumption that you would have been assigned
the role of a decision maker.
O I stay with the group O I defect
.................................................................................................................
Your Decision in the Enforcer Role
Please decide about the payoffs of defectors who throw a 5 or six. Note in the gray cells of the
following table how you decide based on the number of those who defect from your group. Be










1, 2, 3 or 4
Die Result:
5 or 6
0 5 DM -- 15 DM DM*
1 5 DM 5 DM 15 DM DM*
2 10 DM 10 DM 15 DM DM*
3 10 DM 10 DM -- --
*The empty fields in the last column will be filled in by the enforcer. Those payoffs must be
between 0 and 15 DM.
